its only a huge problem for the whole country of Japan and the seas surrounding.
I really don't give a shit about the possible consequences for the rest of the world on this matter.
Then you'll be relieved to know:
Fukushima: Mark 1 Nuclear Reactor Design Caused GE Scientist To Quit In Protest
Thirty-five years ago, Dale G. Bridenbaugh and two of his colleagues at General Electric resigned from their jobs after becoming increasingly convinced that the nuclear reactor design they were reviewing -- the Mark 1 -- was so flawed it could lead to a devastating accident.
Questions persisted for decades about the ability of the Mark 1 to handle the immense pressures that would result if the reactor lost cooling power, and today that design is being put to the ultimate test in Japan. Five of the six reactors at the Fukushima Daiichi plant, which has been wracked since Friday's earthquake with explosions and radiation leaks, are Mark 1s... http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/fukushima-...d=13141287
U.S. nuclear plants similar to Japan plant in peril
Mar 12, 2011
Japan's Fukushima Daiichi Unit 1 reactor that had an explosion and radiation release was a General Electric Co (GE.N) Mark 1 boiling water reactor type.
There are 23 GE Mark 1 reactors operating at U.S. nuclear
power plants... http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/1...2120110312
HAZARDS OF BOILING WATER REACTORS IN THE UNITED STATES
Of the 104 operational nuclear power reactors in the United States, thirty-five are boiling water reactors (BWR). General Electric is the sole designer and manufacturer of BWRs in the United States. The BWR's distinguishing feature is that the reactor vessel serves as the boiler for the nuclear steam supply system. The steam is generated in the reactor vessel by the controlled fissioning of enriched uranium fuel which passes directly to the turbogenerator to generate electricity.
LACK OF CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY DURING A NUCLEAR ACCIDENT
The purpose of a reactor containment system is to create a barrier against the release of radioactivity generated during nuclear power operations from certain "design basis" accidents, such as increased pressure from a single pipe break. It is important to understand that nuclear power plants are not required by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to remain intact as a barrier to all possible accidents or "non-design basis" accidents, such as the melting of reactor fuel. All nuclear reactors can have accidents which can exceed the design basis of their containment.
But even basic questions about the the GE containment design remain unanswered and its integrity in serious doubt. For example, 23 of these BWRs use a smaller GE Mark I pressure suppression containment conceived as a cost-saving alternative to the larger reinforced concrete containments marketed by competitors. A large inverted light-bulb-shaped steel structure called "the drywell" is constructed of a steel liner and a concrete drywell shield wall enclosing the reactor vessel--this is considered the "primary" containment.. The atmosphere of the drywell is connected through large diameter pipes to a large hollow doughnut-shaped pressure suppression pool called "the torus", or wetwell, which is half-filled with water. In the event of a loss-of-coolant-accident (LOCA), steam would be released into the drywell and directed underwater in the torus where it is supposed to condense, thus suppressing a pressure buildup in the containment.
The outer concrete building is the "secondary" containment and is smaller and less robust (and thus cheaper to build) than the containment buildings used at most reactors.
As early as 1972, Dr. Stephen Hanauer, an Atomic Energy Commission safety official, recommended that the pressure suppression system be discontinued and any further designs not be accepted for construction permits. Hanauer's boss, Joseph Hendrie (later an NRC Commissioner) essentially agreed with Hanauer, but denied the recommendation on the grounds that it could end the nuclear power industry in the U.S.
Here are copies of the three original AEC memos, including Hendrie's:
November 11, 1971: outlines problems with the design and pressure suppression system containment.
September 20, 1972: memo from Steven Hanauer recommends that U.S. stop licensing reactors using pressure suppression system
September 25, 1972: memo from Joseph Hendrie (top safety official at AEC) agrees with recommendation but rejects it saying it "could well mean the end of nuclear power..."
In 1976, three General Electric nuclear engineers publicly resigned their prestigious positions citing dangerous shortcomings in the GE design.
An NRC analysis of the potential failure of the Mark I under accident conditions concluded in a 1985 report that Mark I failure within the first few hours following core melt would appear rather likely."
In 1986, Harold Denton, then the NRC's top safety official, told an industry trade group that the "Mark I containment, especially being smaller with lower design pressure, in spite of the suppression pool, if you look at the WASH 1400 safety study, you'll find something like a 90% probability of that containment failing." In order to protect the Mark I containment from a total rupture it was determined necessary to vent any high pressure buildup. As a result, an industry workgroup designed and installed the "direct torus vent system" at all Mark I reactors. Operated from the control room, the vent is a reinforced pipe installed in the torus and designed to release radioactive high pressure steam generated in a severe accident by allowing the unfiltered release directly to the atmosphere through the 300 foot vent stack. Reactor operators now have the option by direct action to expose the public and the environment to unknown amounts of harmful radiation in order to "save containment." As a result of GE's design deficiency, the original idea for a passive containment system has been dangerously compromised and given over to human control with all its associated risks of error and technical failure... http://www.nirs.org/factsheets/bwrfact.htm